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ZEW Summary
Tax competition arguments suggest that governments that operate in an open economy (such as local governments) should not and will not rely on non-benefit taxes, such as the income tax. Yet we observe reliance on income taxes by local governments in many countries, and such reliance changes over time. Evidence from a panel data set of 13 OECD countries over the period [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] suggests that tax competition between levels of government (resulting in a vertical fiscal externality) and between governments at the same level (resulting in a horizontal fiscal externality) provide some economic rationale for changes in local tax rates within countries over time.
Evidence of vertical tax competition is observed in which higher national income tax rates lead to lower local income tax rates. Evidence of horizontal tax competition is found in two variables. First, a measure of mobility suggests that the more mobile the population, the lower are local income tax rates. Second, it is found that greater tax base disparities lead to lower local income tax rates. Moreover, the evidence indicates that the vertical and horizontal fiscal externalities interact. An increase in the national tax rate lowers local income tax rates through the vertical externality, but also lowers tax base disparities and hence increases local income tax rates through the horizontal externality. It is also found that redistributive grants from the national government affect the horizontal externality by lowering tax base disparities and hence increasing local income tax rates.
These results have some interesting implications for fiscal policy in the European Union, particularly as the EU continues to evolve. One implication for the EU is that member expansion that increases tax base disparities within the EU (and is not accompanied by an EU-level income tax) will tend to lower national income tax rates, although this must be qualified because it also depends on the mobility of the population. A second implication is that fiscal expansion of the EU to include an EU-level income tax may tend to lower the reliance of national governments on income taxes through the vertical externality, but may also tend to equalize tax bases across countries, and so increase reliance on national income taxes through the horizontal externality. 
